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THE BELATED DEMISE OF Utah Pie
Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993)
G. Everett Sinor, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's standard for finding liability in primary-line injury cases
has been for more than twenty-five years Justice White's opinion in Utah Pie Co.
v. Continental Baking Co.' The criticism of that opinion began almost immediately
and has not abated.2 The focus of this criticism centered on what many believed to
be the anti-competitive results the standard would produce.' Turnover on the
Supreme Court' and a more advanced understanding of economic theory led to its
overturning.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's recent decision, Brook Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , which changed the standard of liability for-
mulated in the Utah Pie case.7 The Note relates the prior history of the case in the
lower courts8 and also discusses the history of the law in this area of antitrust, ex-
amining both the language of the Acts themselves as well as the prior common law
in the area.9 The Court's holding, and generally the Court's reasoning relating to
the holding, will be stated, as well as the dissent's reasoning,"0 followed by a
1. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70
(1967).
3. See, e.g., id.
4. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Brook Group illustrates the continuous shift in philosophy the whole Court
has endorsed in recent years. This conservative shift, at least on antitrust issues, may not have slowed at all with
President Clinton's election and subsequent appointments of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer to the Supreme Court.
See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), where then-Judge Ginsburg concurred
with then-Judge Clarence Thomas in a decision favoring defendants in merger cases by making it more difficult
for the government to prove monopolization. See Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525
(1st Cir. 1989), where then-Judge Breyer recognized that a § 2 Sherman Act predatory pricing claim would not
be actionable unless below-cost pricing could be proven. Justice Breyer's conservative views on antitrust issues
were the subject of criticism from Senator Howard Metzenbaum and liberal commentators during his confirma-
tion hearings. See Paul M. Barrett, Breyer Hearings Will Weigh Pragmatist's View that Ideas Should Be Judged on
Their Effects, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at A 16; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Nominee; Breyer
Has Opportunity to Recount His Story: Account Is Enthusiastic and Thorough, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1994, at A 17.
5. The Supreme Court never explicitly stated that it was overruling Utah Pie; it only revised the standard by
which liability will be imposed in primary-line injury cases. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). Yet it is hard to imagine the current Court permitting a jury to impose liability
based on Utah Pie's facts. Thus the Utah Pie decision has been effectively overruled.
6. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). The Supreme Court Reporter mistakenly reported the style of this case as Brook
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. The correct corporate name of the plaintiff is Brooke Group,
Ltd. As of this writing, the United States Reports had not reported this decision.
7. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
8. See infra notes 12-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-124 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
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critical analysis of the decision and an attempt to predict which future issues in the
area will be adjudicated.11
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Both parties to this action, Brooke Group, Ltd. [hereinafter Liggett]12 and
Brown & Williamson, are tobacco companies that manufacture cigarettes and dis-
tribute them to wholesalers.13 The cigarette manufacturing industry is a small oli-
gopoly14 with a long history of supracompetitive profits.1" In 1980, when the
demand for cigarettes domestically was at a low point,16 the petitioner Liggett in-
troduced a generic black-and-white cigarette.17 This turned out to be a good move
on Liggett's part; by 1984, when the respondent Brown & Williamson announced
its intention to introduce generic black-and-whites, Liggett owned virtually all of
the generic segment of the market. 8 Additionally, the generic segment had risen
from less than one percent to four percent of total domestic cigarette sales between
1980 and 1984.19 Liggett's share of the whole cigarette market doubled during this
period of time, largely on the basis of this strategic move.2"
Many of the customers of Liggett's black-and-whites were transients from the
branded segment of the market.21 Brown & Williamson was particularly knowl-
edgeable of this switch; it was losing a much greater percentage of its customers
than other firms competing in the branded segment.22 Seeing its profits falling,
Brown & Williamson announced it too would sell black-and-white cigarettes.23
Although R.J. Reynolds had already priced its "Doral" brand at generic prices,
Brown & Williamson's move was more threatening since black-and-whites are
"fungible;" consequently, wholesalers needed only one supplier.24
11. See infra notes 161-219 and accompanying text.
12. This Note refers to the petitioner Brooke Group, Ltd. as Liggett, as the Supreme Court did. This is Brooke
Group, Ltd.'s previous corporate name and the name under which its complaint was originally filed. Brook
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1993).
13. Id.
14. "[F]or decades, production has been dominated by six firms: R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, American
Brands, Lorillard, and the two litigants involved here, Liggett and Brown & Williamson." Id.
15. Id. Supracompetitive profits are revenues over and above one's costs (including opportunity costs). Thus,
one could earn normal accounting profits reflecting one's own opportunity costs without generating economic or
supracompetitive profits. See THOMAS J. HAILSTONES & MICHAEL J. BRENNAN, ECONOMICS 538-40 (1970); see
also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 102-03 (8th ed. 1950) (discussing the importance of the concept
of opportunity cost in economic theory).
16. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2583. "By 1980,. .. broad market trends were working against the industry.
Overall demand for cigarettes in the United States was declining, and no immediate prospect of recovery ex-
isted." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2582.
19. Id.




24. Id. at 2583-84.
[Vol. 15:249
THE BELA TED DEMISE OF UTAH PIE
Brown & Williamson announced a wholesale rebate structure, with larger re-
bates for higher-volume sales.25 In response to Brown & Williamson's entry into
the generic segment, Liggett increased its own volume rebates to beat Brown &
Williamson's price.2" These actions commenced a price war between the two
companies; over a two-week period, Liggett attempted five times to beat Brown &
Williamson's price, but Brown & Williamson always responded by cutting prices
further.27 This price war began and ended before Brown & Williamson sold any
black-and-whites to wholesalers.28
Liggett then filed suit in the Middle District of North Carolina.29 Liggett alleged
in its amended complaint that Brown & Williamson's volume rebate structure
30 vi-
olated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.31
Specifically, Liggett alleged that Brown & Williamson's rebates discriminated in
price between wholesalers, inflicting a primary-line injury.32 Price discrimination
in the present context is referred to as primary-line discrimination since the pur-
pose of the discrimination is to injure "competitors of the discriminating seller."33
The discriminating seller wishes to injure its own competitors in order to reap fu-
ture, supracompetitive profits. a
In the instant case, Liggett alleged that Brown & Williamson priced its black-
and-whites below cost, 35 forcing Liggett to raise its price to show a profit. 36 This
rise in the price of black-and-whites lowered the difference between the branded
and generic prices for cigarettes. 37 Consequently, a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act occurred since the result was a lessening of competition in the generic




29. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F Supp. 344 (M.D.N.C. 1990), affd,
964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
30. Brown & Williamson's volume rebate structure consisted of reducing the list price "sixty to eighty cents
per carton depending on the number of cartons a customer bought from the company." Liggett Group, 748
F Supp. at 350 n. 13.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act states in relevant part that
[it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between differ-
ent purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
Id.
32. Liggett Group, 748 F. Supp. at 347.
33. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2586.
34. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST EcoNoMics 264-65 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. ed.,
1985). Primary-line injuries can be distinguished from secondary-line injuries, whose harm is inflicted on com-
petitors of the buyers of the discriminating seller. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), the leading
Supreme Court case on secondary-line injuries.
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segment."3 This rise in the price of black-and-whites in turn protected the branded
segment of the market by "slow[ing] the rate at which [Brown & Williamson]
branded smokers switched to generics.""
After a long trial,4" the jury returned a $49.6 million verdict against Brown &
Williamson on the Robinson-Patman Act claim.41 Trebled, these damages came to
$148.8 million for Liggett.42 Brown & Williamson then timely moved for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which the district court granted.' 3 The
district court held that a showing of injury to competition is a required element in a
Robinson-Patman Act claim, an element the court held missing in the instant
case .4 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the same basis.4" The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari .46
III. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Statutory Authority
Congress' first foray into the predatory pricing area occurred in 1890 with the
passage of the Sherman Act.47 The Sherman Act was passed in response to a wide-
spread, populist distrust of big business, namely the many trusts that had been
formed.48 In dealing with the problem of breaking up the trusts, Congress also
passed a trust prevention provision designed to prevent businesses without mo-
nopoly power from acquiring it. 4' This provision, section 2 of the Sherman Act,
speaks broadly of both preventing monopolization and preventing the attempt to
monopolize." The "attempt to monopolize" provision of section 2 has been inter-
preted by the courts to prevent "predatory pricing" when there is " 'a dangerous
38. Id. at 353.
39. Id. at 354.
40. The trial took over three months, and there were 2884 exhibits filed. Id  at 348 n.4.
41. Id. at 348. Liggett also alleged that Brown & Williamson violated the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), along with various North Carolina unfair competition laws. Id. The jury returned a
verdict against Liggett on these counts. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 353. The district court also held that: (1) the price discrimination in which Brown & Williamson
engaged did not cause Liggett's alleged injury; and (2) Liggett was not injured. Id. at 360, 364. In the district
court's estimation, both of these holdings would also preclude recovery to Liggett. Id. at 351. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit did not address these issues, holding that its determination of the principal issue-injury to com-
petition-alone precluded recovery. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335,
342 (4th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993).
45. Liggett Group, 964 F2d at 342.
46. BroOk Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 490 (1992).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
48. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 34, at 48-52. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50
(1911).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
50. Id. The relevant text reads: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... "Id.
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THE BELATED DEMISE OF UTAH PIE
probability of actual monopolization.' ",51 Fearing the scope of the Sherman Act
was too narrowly interpreted in the famous Standard Oil case,52 Congress passed
the Clayton Act to proscribe many anti-competitive practices, one of them being
price discrimination. 3 Another goal of the Clayton Act was to encompass a
broader range of predatory activity within the antitrust laws. 4 "The Clayton Act
sought to reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in their incipi-
ency . . .. ,,
The 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, 6 passed largely as a reaction to the Great De-
pression, sought to protect small, "mom and pop" businesses from paying higher
prices to wholesalers and/or input vendors than did their national competitors."'
Thus, the Act's purpose was to prohibit secondary-line injuries" and has little
or no bearing on the issues in the instant case. Since the Robinson-Patman
Act amended the Clayton Act, all of section 2(a) is commonly referred to as the
Robinson-Patman Act and is likewise referenced as such in this Note.
B. Interpretive Standard of a Robinson-Patman Act Claim
The Court first addressed how to interpret the discriminatory pricing language
of the Robinson-Patman Act in Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC.9 In Corn
Products, the defendant was in the business of manufacturing and distributing glu-
cose, principally to candy companies. 6" Glucose was a major component of the
candy manufactured by the defendant's buyers .61 As a result of the necessity of
glucose to candy manufacturers, the manufacturers were keenly aware of price,
largely basing their decisions of whom to buy from on this factor.62
The defendant in Corn Products was charged with price discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act concerning the sale of glucose.63 Specifically, the de-
fendant had two manufacturing plants, one in Chicago, Illinois, and the other in
Kansas City, Missouri.64 The defendant instituted a basing-point pricing system
51. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 (1993) (quoting
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1993)). The original test for § 2 came from Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). There, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled that "when that intent
and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute ... directs itself against that dangerous probability as
well as against the completed result." Id. at 396.
52. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 1. The Standard Oil case dissolved John T. Rockefeller's oil trust, but the
Court's opinion indicated that judges should use their own discretion in determining when a Sherman Act viola-
tion had occurred: the "rule of reason." Id. at 66.
53. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)).
54. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922).
55. Id.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988).
57. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1948).
58. See supra note 34.
59. 324 U.S. 726 (1945).




64. Id. at 730.
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for the glucose.6" The defendant would use the cost of manufacturing glucose at its
Chicago plant as the base price and would then add the cost of freighting the glu-
cose to the customer.66 This practice had the effect of allowing the defendant to
charge more the further away the customer was from Chicago.67 While the prac-
tice of basing-point pricing may bejustified in some cases, 68 it was not in this case
since some of the glucose came from the Kansas City plant.69 Therefore, buyers
who were closer to Kansas City than to Chicago were being charged "phantom
freight" by the defendant, this practice resulting in a price that was not cost-
justified.7"
The Court found that there was price discrimination among buyers of the dis-
criminating seller,71 and that the Robinson-Patman Act would apply.72 The Court
construed the Act to encompass predatory acts "which would probably" lessen
competition.73 "The statute is designed to reach such discriminations 'in their in-
cipiency,' before the harm to competition is effected. It is enough that they 'may'
have the prescribed effect."74 With such language, the Court had given the
Robinson-Patman Act a much broader application than section 2 of the Sherman
Act.7
5
By 1983, when Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.76 was decided,
the standard had evolved broader still. Falls City involved an allegation of a
secondary-line injury in the distribution of beer.77 Vanco Beverage, Inc. [herein-
after Vanco], an Indiana beer wholesaler, specifically alleged that Falls City
Industries, Inc., a Kentucky brewery, sold beer to one of its competitors7 8 at a
lower price, thus violating the Robinson-Patman Act.79
65. Id. at 728-29.
66. Id. at 730.
67. Id.
68. The Robinson-Patman Act exempts discriminations in price that are cost-justified. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
"[N]othing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost
of. . .delivery resulting from the differing methods . . . in which such commodities are to such purchasers...
delivered .... "Id. (emphasis added).
69. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 730 (1945).
70. Id. at 730-31.
71. This type of price discrimination is called a secondary-line injury. See supra note 34 for an explanation of
how to distinguish between the two types of injuries. In determining the standard for a claim, the distinction is
irrelevant.
72. Corn Prods., 324 U.S. at 737.
73. Id. at 738.
74. Id. (quoting Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922)).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
76. 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
77. Id. at 432.
78. Its competitor, Dawson Springs, Inc. [hereinafter Dawson Springs], was a Kentucky wholesaler, so the
competition was not direct. Id. at 431. "The two distributors did not compete for sales to the same retailers. ...
because Indiana wholesalers were prohibited by state law from selling to out-of-state retailers and Indiana retail-
ers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers." Id. at 432 (citation omitted). Vanco al-
leged that since it and Dawson Springs were in the same geographic market, though not the same state, they were
competitors for Robinson-Patman Act purposes. Id. at 433.
79. Id. at 432.
[Vol. 15:249
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The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a Robinson-Patman Act claim need
show only a "reasonable possibility that a price difference may harm
competition."8" Meeting that standard "establish[es] a prima facie violation"8' of
the Robinson-Patman Act, which can be rebutted only by defenses specifically in
the Act (like the cost-justification defense, although there are others).82 This
standard clearly attempted to preempt any interest a seller might have in obtaining
supracompetitive profits by discriminating in price.
C. The Utah Pie Case
The only case prior to the instant case in which the Supreme Court specifically
addressed a Robinson-Patman Act primary-line injury in an oligopoly setting was
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking CoY The Utah Pie Company [hereinafter
Utah Pie] filed suit against three of its competitors in the Salt Lake City market
alleging a primary-line injury.84 Specifically, Utah Pie sold frozen pies in Salt
Lake City and surrounding areas, including other states.85 Utah Pie started selling
frozen pies in 1957;88 by 1958, it was the dominant firm of its type in Salt Lake
City.87 This booming market88 attracted the defendants to compete vigorously with
Utah Pie on price.89 The defendants discriminated across geographic boundaries
with respect to price.90 Although Utah Pie never again owned more than sixty per-
cent of the market, as it had in 1958, it was still the dominant firm after the de-
fendants' actions. 91
The Court held that the defendants' actions were sufficient for ajury to find lia-
bility. 2 The Court never set down an element-like test that trial courts should fol-
low to determine if there has been a primary-line injury; instead the Court looked
at factors from which the lower courts could infer an injury.9"
80. Id. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
81. lId. at 434.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). In addition to the cost-justification defense, there are defenses against price discrimi-
nation when (1) "the Federal Trade Commission ... establish[es] quantity limits... ; and the foregoing shall
then not be construed to permit differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those so . . . estab-
lished," id.; (2) a competitor "select[s] [its] own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade,"
id.; (3) a competitor acts "in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the
goods concerned," id.; and (4) a competitor "meet[s] an equally low price of a competitor," 15 U.S.C. § 13(b).
83. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
84. Id. at 687.
85.Id. at 689.
86. Id.
87. Id. In 1957, Utah Pie owned 66.5% of the Salt Lake City market. Id.
88. Id. During the time period when the price discrimination occurred (1958-1961), the sale of frozen pies
more than quadrupled. Id. In 1958, frozen pie sales in Salt Lake City were approximately 57,000; by 1961, sales
were over 266,000. Id.
89. Id. at 691.
90. Id. at 693-94. The Court held that the jury could have found that the defendants had priced lower in Salt
Lake City than in California and other western markets. Id.
91. Id. at 689. In both 1960 and 1961, Utah Pie owned approximately 45 % of the Salt Lake City market; no
other company held more than 30 % of the market during this period. Id. at 691.
92. Id. at 697-98.
93.Id. at 692.
.1994]
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The Court relied heavily on the fact that it appeared that the defendants were
selling their pies in Salt Lake City below cost.94 Each defendant's closest frozen pie
factory was in California.95 Accordingly, each defendant incurred transportation
costs in getting the pies to distributors, and eventually to market, in Salt Lake
City.96 Utah Pie did not have this problem; its factory was in Salt Lake City, which
afforded it natural cost advantages. 97 Looking at this factor, the Court held that the
defendants' pricing could be found by a jury to be below cost in Salt Lake City dur-
ing the relevant time period.98
The Court also focused on what appeared to be predatory intent by the defend-
ants.99 Justice White reasoned that it was proper for the jury to consider the de-
fendants' intent to injure Utah Pie in determining if a primary-line injury had
occurred. 0I0 This evil intent would tend to establish that a lessening of competition
may occur because of the defendants' actions. "
After the Utah Pie decision, juries were left with no definite standard with
which to specifically define a primary-line injury. Juries only had the broad stand-
ard of Corn Products0 2 and its progeny. 10 3 The Court looked to the defendants' sub-
jective intent,"0 4 as well as the defendants' decisions to price below cost in Salt
Lake City,10 ' and determined that the jury could have found a primary-line injury,
even though consumers in Salt Lake City were buying more pies, even though
those same consumers were paying a much lower price, and even though the plain-
tiff, Utah Pie, remained the market leader. 10 Utah Pie was criticized by many an-
titrust scholars and commentators;0 7 a more definite rule was needed in the area.
D. The Matsushita Case
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 8 another
concept - recoupment -was added into antitrust analysis. The Matsushita case
94. Id. at 698.
95. Id. at 689.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 698.
99. Id. at 702. One of the defendants, Pet Milk Company, sent industrial spies into Utah Pie's plant to uncover
information which could later be used to discredit Utah Pie with respect to one of its competitors. Id. at 697. Pet
Milk Company admitted this, but denied that it ever used the information against Utah Pie. Id.
100. Id. at 697-98.
101. Id. at 702-03.
102. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945). See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
104. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967).
105. Id. at 698.
106. Id. at 703.
107. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2586-87 (1993). See, e.g.,
3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD R TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 720c (1978); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Bowman, supra note 2; see also DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND
MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE ch. 6 (2d ed. 1990) (criticizing the effect the antitrust laws on price
discrimination have on businesses).
108. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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involved a section 1 Sherman Act claim."0 9 According to the American manufac-
turers who filed the claim, five Japanese manufacturers were pricing television
sets at supracompetitive levels in Japan, where the market was protected.11 They
then sold the same sets in America at a much lower price, allegedly below cost."
The Court held that for the American manufacturers to recover on their
Sherman Act claim, the Japanese manufacturers must be able to recoup the losses
they incurred in pricing below cost." 2 The Japanese manufacturers' losses that
were incurred by pricing below cost must potentially be recouped by supracom-
petitive profits in the American market once the American manufacturers had
been driven out." 3 Allegedly, this conspiracy was to be made easier for the Japa-
nese manufacturers to accomplish since their economic profits in Japan could tide
them over until the Americans either agreed to raise prices above a competitive
level or fold permanently." 4
The Court found entry into the American electronics market too easy to allow
prolonged supracompetitive profits sufficient to recover losses. 11 "[T]he prolifer-
ation of. . . firms" was one good indication of the unlikelihood of prolonged su-
pracompetitive profits." 6 New entry is not limited to the fallen competitors; new
American firms as well as firms in other countries, particularly Asian countries,
would quickly drive the price down if the price was raised above the competitive
level."' The Matsushita Court determined that, accepting the plaintiffs' theory of
predation, the defendants must be able to sustain their supracompetitive profits for
a period of"at least thirty years" to recoup their losses, a length of time too incredi-
ble for the Court to find possible." 8 In addition, empirical data of the market
showed that the American manufacturers' share of the market remained relatively
stable over the period of the alleged predatory pricing. "' The Court held that there
was no evidence to suggest that recoupment was possible under the factual sce-
nario presented. 2 0
It appeared that the Matsushita Court required more evidence against the pred-
ator than the Utah Pie Court did; however, the Matsushita case was a section 1
Sherman Act case, not a Robinson-Patman Act primary-line injury case. While
many circuits refused to follow Utah Pie,'2' and added recoupment into primary-
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
I10. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 578.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 588-89.
113. Id. at 589.
114. Id. at 584.
115. Id. at 591 n.15.
116. Id. at 592 n.15.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 591.
120. Id. at 597.
121. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
19941
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line injury cases on their own, 122 other circuits were reluctant to summarily ignore
the decision. 123 The Supreme Court finally incorporated Matsushita's recoupment
theory into its analysis of primary-line injury cases in Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp.124
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that a section 2 Sherman Act
claim and a Robinson-Patman Act claim have virtually the same purpose. 125 Both
Acts seek to prevent injury to competition through discrimination of price by a
competitor.126 The difference between the two laws is that the Robinson-Patman
Act seeks to encompass a broader range of conduct by installing an easier test of
injury.'27 Confronted with a Robinson-Patman Act claim, a trial court must find
that the discrimination in price has "'a reasonable possibility' of substantial injury
to competition." 28
The Court rejected a per se rule of non-liability in an oligopoly setting for com-
petitors accused of violating the Robinson-Patman Act. 129 The Court explained
that the Fourth Circuit's opinion could have been read to imply such a rule, which
would be contrary to the purpose of the Act. 3 ' The language of the Act functions
generally to prevent harm to competition, in whatever setting the price discrimi-
nation occurs.13'
The Court then listed the two prerequisites needed to prove a primary-line
injury. 32 When a competitor is discriminating in price, a plaintiff must first show
122. See, e.g., Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987).
123. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1019 (1990). In RoseAcre Farms, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook discussed his general disinclination to over-
rule precedent. He first noted the "universal academic disdain" for the Utah Pie decision and the Supreme Court's
reluctance to revisit the issue. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1404. These factors were not enough for Judge
Easterbrook:
No case since Utah Pie questions its holding, as opposed to its outlook. Inferior federal courts, in order to
provide equal justice under law, must apply the holdings of cases still on the books. . . .Sometimes the
imminent demise of a precedent may be plain, as when it rests wholly on an opinion since overruled
.... When the case stands unquestioned, however, a belief that the Court would not reach the same
decision today if the question were open anew is not a basis for disregarding the law on the books.
Id. at 1405 (citations omitted). Judge Easterbrook went on to conclude that since Utah Pie had not been over-
ruled, the concept of recoupment should not be integrated into primary-line injury analysis. Id. Further discus-
sion of Rose Acre Farms is located infra at notes 191-94 and 208-11 and accompanying text.
124. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
125. Id. at 2587.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 (1983)) (emphasis
added). Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires that the predator's price discrimination create "'a dangerous prob-
ability of actual monopolization.'" Id. (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 890(1993))
(emphasis added). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
129. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (1993).
130. Id. at 2590-91.
131. Id. at 2591.
132. Id. at 2587-88.
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that the alleged predator has priced below cost. '33 The Court explained that to hold
otherwise could prevent valid, consumer welfare-enhancing competition.,"
The second prerequisite is a finding that the predator has "a reasonable prospect
• . . of recouping its investment in below-cost prices. ""' Thus, there must be a
reasonable prospect that the losses incurred in the scheme will be less than the su-
pracompetitive profits garnered by the predator later, for if there is no possibility
that the predator will profit from his endeavor, consumers will be better off in the
aggregate. 136 Not only must the predator recoup the nominal value of the money
previously invested, he must also take into account the "time value of the money
invested." 137 Future profits must be discounted to present value when determining
whether recoupment is reasonably possible. 
138
The jury had returned a verdict in favor of Liggett; 139 thus, the Supreme Court
viewed the facts in Liggett's favor. 140 The Court held that reasonable jurors could
have found that Brown & Williamson priced its black-and-whites below cost dur-
ing the relevant period.' 4 ' The Court concluded, however, that the second
element - a reasonable possibility of recoupment - could not have been found by
the jury. 142
Liggett's theory of recoupment was that Brown & Williamson's below-cost
pricing would eventually lead to higher prices in the generic segment. '1 3 These
higher prices in the generic segment, sustained by the threat of another round of
price cutting, would allow them to earn supracompetitive profits.' The Court
held that proving this theory could be accomplished in one of two ways: either a
showing of actual supracompetitive prices in the generic segment of the market,
or a showing that supracompetitive prices in the generic segment could likely have
been brought about by Brown & Williamson. 4' Justice Kennedy ruled that there
was no subsequent supracompetitive pricing in the generic segment of the mar-
ket. 146 Output "expanded. . . rapid[ly]" in the market after Brown & Williamson's
move to compete with Liggett in the generic segment.' 47 That fact alone was not
dispositive; output could have expanded at an even higher pace absent Brown &
133. Id. at 2587.
134. Id. at 2588.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2589.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 348 (M.D.N.C. 1990),
affd, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
140. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2582.
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Williamson's actions. 48 However, the Court held that not even a "reasonable infer-
ence" could be drawn to suggest that output would have been higher. 
149
The Court also held that there was no likelihood that Brown & Williamson's
actions could have caused supracompetitive pricing.1"' Industry conditions were
such as to prevent supracompetitive pricing in the relevant period.151 Demand in
the industry was declining. 2 The oligopolists had excess capacity during this per-
iod."53 There were many different "product types and pricing variables" which
would make tacit collusion difficult.5 4 These factors indicated to the Court that it
was not reasonable for the jury to find that competition in the generic segment of
the market had been threatened by Brown & Williamson's actions.155
B. Dissenting Opinion
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun,
agreed with the majority that a primary-line injury can occur in an oligopoly set-
ting. 15 6 Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority in that he would have held that
the jury could have found a reasonable possibility of injury to competition by
Brown & Williamson's actions. 17
The dissent stated that Brown & Williamson's anti-competitive intent, coupled
with an industry that had historically sustained economic profits, was enough to
suggest that there was a reasonable possibility of a primary-line injury. '58 Justice
Stevens stated that there was plenty of evidence suggesting that prices were supra-
competitive; in the late-1980s, list prices "rose regularly and significantly" for
both branded and generic cigarettes.1 59 The jury, according to Justice Stevens,
could properly infer a possibility of injury by Brown & Williamson's actions in








154. Id. at 2596.
155. Id. at 2597.
156. Id. at 2598 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Utah Pie Co. v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). See supra notes 83-107 and accompanying text.
157. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2606 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 2603.
159. Id. at 2604.
160. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Oligopolists Not Immune from the Robinson-Patman Act
The first broad principle enunciated by the Court was that a competitor can in-
flict a primary-line injury in an oligopoly setting.161 This is certainly correct, and
seems almost axiomatic given the language of the Act itself. The Act reads that
price discrimination is unlawful "where the effect . . . may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 162 An oligopolist could surely
pull off the feat of lessening competition, given the appropriate circumstances. In
a two-firm oligopoly, those firms acting in concert could have just as much power
in a market as a monopolist. The two firms need only determine the monopoly
price and produce half the output needed to maintain that price. The one variable
is that of cooperation between the oligopolists as long as other things remain equal
(i.e., input variables as well as demand). Although this variable can at times be
problematic for the oligopolists,"6 ' it still does not absolutely prevent the oligopo-
lists from effectuating power strong enough to "lessen competition.' 64
This is the extreme case of oligopoly behavior. Under this scenario, the
Robinson-Patman Act claim is unnecessary since this is simple price fixing, a sep-
arate antitrust violation. 6 ' Oligopolists are rarely this naive. In the hypothetical
two-firm oligopoly, if one oligopolist plunges its price below cost, the second oli-
gopolist may recognize what the first is doing and follow suit. After eliminating
the desired victim, they both may then raise their prices in order to produce half
the output, doing so without ever communicating. These actions clearly injure
competition even though there is more than one predator.
The instant case was not the first time the Supreme Court recognized that oligo-
polists could be liable. Indeed, the principal primary-line injury case previously
addressed by the Court, Utah Pie, involved an oligopoly (and liability was im-
posed). 16 6 The Fourth Circuit's ambiguous language on this point... may have re-
flected its correct belief that there had been a shift in the Supreme Court's focus in
161. Id. at 2591 (Kennedy, J.). See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 34, at 192-225 for a more thorough discus-
sion of oligopoly behavior.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
163. In particular, there is the natural incentive to cheat on the agreement. If one oligopolist can price lower
while the other maintains an artificially high monopoly price, then the first oligopolist can increase its profits.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
166. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
167. The Fourth Circuit's opinion stated that:
In short, Brown & Williamson controlled only 12 % of the relevant market and could not be assured,
when it began its alleged below-cost pricing to suppress competition from Liggett, that the other manu-
facturers would not also respond competitively. Consequently, the pricing policies undertaken by Brown
& Williamson, while perhaps intended to injure Liggett, could not be found to be predatory because they
did not provide an economically rational basis "to recoup . . . losses and to harvest some additional
gain."
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)), affdsubnom. Brook Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). This could fairly be read to be a broad statement
of the principle applicable in all primary-line injury cases, or limited to the factual situation at hand.
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these cases to a more "law and economics" viewpoint. It is true that the possibility
of a lessening of competition through predatory pricing is remote in an oligopoly
setting, even when there is express collusion. This does not mean, however, that a
lessening of competition is impossible. Although the Court in the principal case
rejected the low standard of liability laid down in Utah Pie,18 it nevertheless cor-
rectly recognized that the focus in a Robinson-Patman Act claim should be on
competition, not on the number of predators. 69
B. Elements of a Primary-Line Injury Claim
The Court molded parts of both the Utah Pie case"O and the Matsushita case'7'
into a standard for primary-line injury cases. This new standard provides that
once a predator has been found to have discriminated in price: (1) the predator
must have priced below cost in the discriminating market; 72 and (2) the predator
must have had a "reasonable possibility" of recouping its losses with future eco-
nomic profits.'73 This new standard virtually ignores the intent of the alleged
predator, relying instead on its actions and empirical economic data bearing on the
possibility of a successful scheme.
C. An Appropriate Measure of Cost: Footnote One
As stated earlier, the Court held that an element in a Robinson-Patman Act
claim is that the discriminating seller must have priced below cost. '74 Prices at or
above cost cannot by definition be predatory. If a firm is being driven out of the
market by an alleged predator pricing above cost, then they are being beaten not by
predatory behavior, but by more efficient production. This is the essence of com-
petition; the high cost firm gets driven out while the low cost entrepreneur enjoys
profits until an equally efficient competitor enters the market. In this way, con-
sumer welfare is enhanced by providing an incentive to find the lowest price avail-
able, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources.
This begs the question: How should courts in practice determine what the cost
to manufacture a particular good is? Nearly all economists on this point agree that
marginal cost should be the proper measure for determining when a competitor is
pricing below cost. 7 5 A competitor who prices below marginal cost will not be
behaving in a wealth-maximizing manner since a higher price would increase the
168. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 685.
169. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (1993). See Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
170. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 685.
171. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 574.
172. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587. See infra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
173. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588. See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
174. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587.
175. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 107; Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); see also BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra
note 34, for a general discussion of marginal cost analysis; cf WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS 126-27 (1986)
(agreeing that marginal cost is more appropriate than average cost in "optimal pricing," but arguing that an aver-
age incremental cost standard "ha[s] a more critical role in the fairness of pricing") (emphasis added).
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firm's overall profits (absent the long-run, supracompetitive profits the Robinson-
Patman Act was designed to prevent). The problem with using marginal cost as a
basis for liability in a primary-line injury claim is that marginal cost is an ex-
tremely hard figure to determine. Although economists can give a general idea of
what the shape of an industry's marginal cost curve looks like, it is difficult for a
competitor to determine at various increments what the cost of a particular good
is. 176
Recognizing the problems inherent in using marginal cost as the basis for a
court determining liability, Professors Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner sug-
gested using average variable cost as a "surrogate" '177 for marginal cost. 178 Typi-
cally, marginal cost will exceed average variable cost within the relevant range of
output.179 Their main justification for using average variable cost as a substitute
for marginal cost is that determining whether predatory pricing is pro- or anti-
competitive in various situations is usually difficult. 180 Errors in imposing liabil-
ity will harm consumers by protecting inefficient competitors; a little leeway may
be preferable to protect against those types of errors."'
The Court had not heretofore addressed the question of what should be the
proper measure of cost in primary-line injury cases. In Matsushita, the Court did
not determine whether the alleged predator priced below cost, since another ele-
ment of the claim alleged - a section 1 Sherman Act claim - was missing. 18 2 In the
instant case, the Court again would not take up the question of how cost should be
measured.183 The text of footnote one to the Court's opinion in the instant case
reads: "Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is
average variable cost, however, we again decline to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts over the appropriate measure of cost." 84 The Court held that the jury
176. Although difficult, marginal cost is not impossible to ascertain. In particular, regulated industries are re-
quired in some instances to calculate the marginal cost of their product. Interview with John W. Mayo, Associate
Professor of Economics and Research, Center for Business and Economic Research, University of Tenn., in
Knoxville, Tenn. (Jan. 6, 1994).
177. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 716.
178. One determines average variable cost by taking total cost, subtracting fixed costs, and dividing by output
[(TC-FC)/Output]. Fixed costs were not included in Professors Areeda and Turner's proposal because of the pos-
sibility that a firm may be facing losses regardless of its actions. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 704. In
such a situation, its best move is to price below average total cost, but at or above average variable cost, depending
on demand. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 704 n.20.
179. Telephone Interview with John W. Mayo, Associate Professor of Economics and Research, Center for
Business and Economic Research, University of Tenn., in Knoxville, Tenn. (Nov. 10, 1994). See also WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982) for a more thor-
ough study of industry structure as it relates to cost.
180. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 718.
181. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 718.
182. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584-85 n.8 (1986). The Court held
that the alleged predators had not entered into an agreement that violated § I of the Sherman Act. Id. For a discus-
sion of the Matsushita case and its relevance to primary-line injury analysis, see supra notes 108-24 and accom-
panying text.
183. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 n. 1 (1993).
184. Id.
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could have found that Brown & Williamson priced below average variable cost."18
Had the Court held both that Brown & Williamson could recoup its investment in
the scheme, and that Brown & Williamson priced above average variable cost,
Liggett could have argued the substance of footnote one before the Supreme
Court. The next case the Court could address in this area is a case presenting the
question of how cost in this context should be measured.
It is certainly true that average variable cost is easier to determine than mar-
ginal cost in most situations.186 Professors Areeda and Turner correctly state that
the accounting books of firms will most often state average cost rather than mar-
ginal cost figures. 87 In most situations, any difference between the two values
will benefit the alleged predator, since the normal situation is that marginal cost
will be above average variable cost in the relevant range of demand. 188 However,
when marginal cost is below average variable cost, a strict adherence to an average
variable cost test could prevent legitimate pricing, i.e., pricing above marginal
cost. This situation in the relevant range of demand typically is present when there
is excess capacity in the industry. 89
D. Recoupment Required in Primary-Line Injury Cases
In Brook Group, the Court significantly raised the standard of proof for a pri-
mary-line injury case. One way in which it raised the standard was by requiring
proof of possible recoupment by the predator.1 0
This move by the Supreme Court was foreshadowed by Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook's opinion in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc."' In
discussing this issue, Judge Easterbrook bandied about different approaches courts
could use to find predatory behavior. 92 He concluded that requiring a finding of
recoupment is the easiest and most accurate way to determine if the market is con-
ducive to predatory pricing schemes.193 "Market structure offers a way to cut the
inquiry off at the pass . . . . Only if market structure makes recoupment feasible
need a court inquire into the relation between price and cost."194
Recoupment is the only rational reason a predator would attempt to inflict a
primary-line injury.195 If the predator does not recoup, it loses money. The loss
that the predator would take in that situation would be beneficial to the consumer
185. Id. at 2592.
186. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
187. Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 716.
188. Telephone Interview with John W. Mayo, supra note 179.
189. Interview with John W. Mayo, supra note 176. This is also true in markets that are naturally monopolistic.
Interview with John W. Mayo, supra note 176.
190. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993).
191.881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). See also Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809
F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987); D.E. Rogers Assoc., Inc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
192. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400.
193. Id. at 1401.
194. Id.
195. This of course assumes that rational decisions are wealth-maximizing ones.
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in the long run (i.e., more output at lower prices). The Court recognized two ways
a predator could recoup its losses: (1) driving the prey from the market; or
(2) causing a large enough drop in demand for the victim's product to force it to
raise its price in conformance with the predator's wish." 6 In either situation, the
predator uses its superior market power as a weapon to get the result it wants -a
net balance of profits above a competitive level.
The Court recognized that recoupment is, in practice, a very difficult thing to
achieve, 97 even more so in a situation like the instant case where the alleged pre-
dation occurs in an oligopoly setting. A monopolist can be sure that all profits fol-
lowing the demise of a weaker competitor will belong solely to it; an oligopolist
must share the future profits with its fellow oligopolists. Thus, two situations can
arise in such a setting. If all the oligopolists attempt to inflict a primary-line injury
by pricing below cost, the investment by each could be relatively small (the victim
could be driven out or forced to raise prices rather quickly). Price discrimination
in this manner could also subject the oligopolist to liability as a result of either ex-
press or tacit collusion."9 8 If, on the other hand, one oligopolist decides to "go it
alone," it bears the brunt of the losses while having to share the potential future
profits.
In the instant case, Brown & Wiliamson "went it alone" when it decided to
price below cost. Given its small market share,199 Brown & Williamson would
need to garner enormous supracompetitive profits in the future to recoup its
losses.200 Two questions come to mind in the "go it alone" cases: (1) Should a mini-
mum level of market share be required to find a "reasonable possibility" of recoup-
ment? and (2) What other conditions should be factored into the recoupment
analysis?
The first question, in theory, should be answered negatively, since firms with
small market shares are capable of gaining back their investment, given the right
market conditions. For instance, in the principal case, Brown & Williamson had
approximately eleven percent of the market during the relevant time period.21
Thus, Brown & Williamson would need "to generate around $9 in supracompeti-
tive profits for each $1 invested in predation," not including the time value of the
money. 202
While this is certainly unlikely, it is not impossible. However, a practical figure
is needed for simplicity. A per se non-liability rule under a threshold level of
196. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993). The latter the-
ory was alleged by Liggett in the instant case. Id.
197. Id. at 2589.
198. For a discussion of both the economics and the penalties imposed by such behavior, see DAvID L.
KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST ch.
6(1995).
199. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2590. Brown & Williamson had only "11-12 %" of the market during the rele-
vant time period. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2583.
202. Id. at 2590.
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market power would greatly enhance efficiency with an earlier disposition of in-
adequate claims by summary judgment. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [herein-
after HHI] 2 3 requirement of 2500 by participating oligopolists acknowledges the
great difficulty oligopolists have in successfully accomplishing their predatory
scheme, but it does not prevent lower courts from sanctioning firms with signifi-
cant monopoly power, though not necessarily absolute market control .204 Alterna-
tively, a threshold HHI figure of 2500 could be a demarcation, under which there
would be a presumption against liability.
Other factors could also be included in the analysis to create a function of possi-
ble summary judgment dismissals. Some factors that should be considered include
the extent of organized collusion, the elasticity of the demand curve, the height of
entry barriers to the market, and other factors the Court could formulate, all bear-
ing on the probability of recoupment by the predator. A somewhat stable consen-
sus should be reached by the different circuits in the upcoming years concerning
the early disposal of questionable primary-line injury claims, taking these factors
into account.
Without the presence of market conditions favorable to the potential predator,
recoupment is nearly impossible. For example, in an industry with an extremely
elastic demand curve, like the grain production industry, a primary-line injury
claim is laughable. Adding recoupment as an element integrates market condition
analysis into primary-line cases and ensures that the antitrust laws indeed "'pro-
tect[] . . . competition, not competitors.' "20
E. Elimination of Predatory Intent as an Element
The Utah Pie Court allowed the jury to infer injury to competition from the dis-
criminating sellers' predatory intent.2°6 Justice White rested this proposition
rather weakly on statements in previous Supreme Court and circuit court opin-
ions, focusing on the presence of predatory intent by the defendant, without defin-
ing what predatory intent is. 217 In Rose Acre Farms,20 8 the court expressed its
reservations regarding use of intent to determine if conduct is anti-competitive.209
The defendant had threatened the plaintiff, stating: "'We are going to run you out
203. "The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares . . . ." U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992). For further information on the
source of this important calculation, see Albert 0. Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AMER. ECON. REV.
761 (1964).
204. An HHI requirement of 2500 reflects one firm with a 50% market share, two firms with a 35.4% market
share each, or three firms with a 28.9% market share each. In the instant case, Brown & Williamson's HHI was
between 121 and 144, easily failing to meet the threshold.
205. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,2588 (1993) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,320 (1962)).
206. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702-03 (1967).
207. Id. at 696-97 n. 12.
208. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1019(1990).
209. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F2d at 1400-03.
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of. . .business. Your days are numbered.' "2" However, the court was not im-
pressed with this and similar statements, going on to hold that "intent is not a basis
of liability (or a ground for inferring the existence of such a basis) in a predatory
pricing case under the Sherman Act."2 1
The Court in the instant case integrated Rose Acre Farms into primary-line in-
jury cases and put virtually no focus on the intent of the predator, focusing instead
on the potential results of the predator's actions.212 This "results" analysis seems
more in line with the original intent of the antitrust laws: protection of competi-
tion.21 A competitor with evil intent but no market power, who makes the irratio-
nal decision to price below cost, poses no threat to competition; no inference
should be made in such a situation that competition has been injured.2" 4
The pitfall in making such an inference is obvious. Lowering prices can have an
anti-competitive effect (that the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to pre-
vent),2"' but it can also have a pro-competitive effect. In a historically oligopolistic
market especially, lower prices could be the market's natural signal that the indus-
try is ready to transfer to a more competitive market based more acutely on price.
An inference of primary-line injury would prevent exactly what both economists
and consumers wish.
In addition, intent to injure a fellow competitor is more often than not healthy
for the market rather than anti-competitive. In a zero-sum game, the only way to
increase one's wealth is to take wealth from another. In the instant case, the com-
petitors were in a negative-sum game; the demand for cigarettes was falling.216
Liggett then entered the generic segment.2"7 Brown & Williamson was about to be
steamrolled; its natural instinct was to follow where the market demand was -in
the generic segment- which of course would shrink Liggett's market if Brown &
Williamson found any kind of market for their own generic cigarettes. 2 1 It is just
as probable that, based solely on proof bearing on Brown & Williamson's intent,
their move was pro-competitive rather than anti-competitive. 219 The Court cor-
rectly de-emphasized the intent of Brown & Williamson in the instant case.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to provide a thorough, critical analysis of the Court's
decision in Brook Group. Future litigation in this area at the circuit level will most
210. Id. at 1402.
211. Id.
212. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993).
213. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
214. "Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a
claim under the federal antitrust laws .... Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2589.
215. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
216. Brook Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2583.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2583-84.
219. See generally A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging that juries could easily misinterpret the difference between statements indicating predatory in-
tent and statements that are competitively motivated), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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likely focus on the amount of evidence needed by a plaintiff to avoid summary
judgment. The Court has placed a high hurdle over which plaintiffs must jump; it
will be intriguing to observe the different circuits flesh out the Supreme Court's
standard, if presented with more egregious facts than those given in the instant
case.
The Supreme Court's next entry into the area may also be a case presenting the
question of what should be the appropriate measure of cost in a Robinson-Patman
Act claim. The Court may indirectly answer this question in a case not involving a
primary-line injury, but rather another type of antitrust case.22 Regardless of how
the issue of cost is addressed, the Court should proceed cautiously in this area
since the question is still being debated in the scholarly community of lawyers and
economists.
220. The Court has done this before. Specifically, the Court incorporated the concept of recoupment into the
primary-line injury field in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), a § I
Sherman Act claim. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of recoup-
ment as it relates to a primary-line injury. Cost is a concept permeating every area of the antitrust field; thus, an
answer to the cost question could come before the Supreme Court in the near future.
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